Krah: Knew Jian G. since 2015

AfD European leadership candidate Maximilian Krah said he had known his former employee Jian G., who is in custody for alleged espionage for China, for less than ten years. "I have known my former employee since 2015. He and his company were clients of my law firm. At a time when I was not yet an AfD member," Krah said in a video interview on the AfD-affiliated YouTube channel "Neverforgetniki". Krah used to be a member of the CDU and, according to information on his website, switched to the AfD in 2016.

In the interview published on Thursday, the MEP once again attacked the security authorities and linked the arrest of his employee to the upcoming European elections: "(...) dropping this bombshell right at the time of the postal vote campaign, I stand by that, it's no coincidence. Someone is working purposefully here and we are actually dealing with a campaign by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (...)". Krah had already accused the authorities in "Stern" of having knowledge of Jian G., but "contrary to duty, not having warned or informed him at any time".

After the initial shock in the espionage affair, the AfD has now switched from defense to attack mode and is positioning itself as the victim of a possible campaign. "There is a suspicion that this man was deliberately targeted at the AfD by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in order to harm our party," Saxony's AfD leader Jörg Urban said earlier this week about the Jian G. case. Party leader Chrupalla had said at the AfD's election campaign kick-off that it was adventurous "by what means our party is to be destroyed".

It is known that Jian G. had tried to work for the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) a few years ago, but the BND refused to cooperate, according to dpa information. According to reports, the man later approached the Saxon Office for the Protection of the Constitution. "Bild" had reported, citing intelligence service files, that the Saxon Office for the Protection of the Constitution had registered G. as an informant in 2007. He had provided information about possible activities of Chinese intelligence services in Germany, for example against Chinese opposition members and information about people, companies and groups with possible contacts to Chinese intelligence services. Eight years later, however, according to this information, he himself was targeted by the intelligence services on suspicion of being a double agent.